Articles About Investments

One of the biggest trends in the investment industry in recent years has been explosive growth in the variety, availability, and use of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). Not only because they are more tax efficient, have more flexible trading, and are typically less expensive – which has made them a popular way to implement passive investing strategies – but also because even advisors who actively manage portfolios themselves appear to be used ETFs are the core “passive” building block for their active ETF strategies. However, the industry still shows that the overwhelming majority of advisors still use mutual funds as well, which in turn raises the question: how, exactly, do advisors choose between mutual funds versus ETFs and select the particular investment vehicle they’re going to use… and from the asset manager’s perspective, what should fund companies be doing to get their investment solutions in front of advisors?

In this context, a recent industry study published by Erdos & Morgan provides a fascinating look into what advisors actually view as the most important factors when selecting fund providers. Not surprisingly, performance and fees rank were top-ranking factors, but advisors also place a high value on a fund provider’s approach to managing volatility and their perceived trustworthiness… and surprisingly (or not) weight at all on the fund company’s marketing materials, wholesalers, or “thought leadership” white papers. And the trend is especially pronounced amongst the RIA channel, which sits the furthest from traditional commission-based fund distribution models, and appears to be the most likely to take a “don’t call us, we’ll call you” approach to selecting fund providers to work with.

In fact, another study from Advisor Perspectives (also looking at fund company selection by advisors) found that advisors are becoming increasingly sophisticated in regards to evaluating a fund’s fees and performance, instead of relying on the higher-level “rankings” from research providers (e.g., Morningstar’s star ratings). And to the extent that advisors want “value-added” services from fund providers, the desire is not for practice management advice, but simply more accessibility to deeper investment expertise, from having more direct access to fund managers and research analysts, and demanding that wholesalers themselves be increasingly investment savvy (with real investment expertise like CIMA certification) as well.

The bottom line, though, is simply that with all the rapid changes occurring in the industry, there is growing recognition that the traditional distribution approach of fund providers and asset managers is changing. Yet thus far, fund companies appear to be struggling to adapt, leading to especially low reputation scores from RIAs compared to advisors working at broker-dealers, and substantial negativity towards traditional wholesalers. The good news, however, is that in the end, client assets still have to be invested somewhere… which means there is a substantial opportunity for the fund providers that can learn to adapt most quickly to the new normal of how advisors select investment solutions.

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Earlier this week, Vanguard announced that in August it will begin offering commission-free ETF trading through its Investor.Vanguard.com online brokerage platform on a whopping 1,800 ETFs… which includes not just its own ETFs, which were available commission-free already, but virtually all ETFs, including those from all their major competitors like Blackrock, State Street, and Schwab (on top of the 2,500+ mutual funds already available through Vanguard without trading fees). Yet while the media immediately jumped on the announcement as a new stage of the price wars on ETF trading costs, as Vanguard’s platform will offer nearly 5X – 10X the breadth of ETFs as their largest competitors… the real significance of Vanguard’s announcement is much bigger.

In this week’s #OfficeHours with @MichaelKitces, my Tuesday 1PM EST broadcast via Periscope, we discuss why the real impact of Vanguard’s announcement is a potentially fatal disruption to the nature of no-transaction-fee (NTF) ETF platforms themselves, undermining existing pay-to-play distribution agreements to the most popular NTF ETF platforms today, and potentially pushing RIA custodial platforms instead to charge advisors (or investors) a more transparent and less conflicted basis point fee directly for the clearing, custodial, and other services they provide.

Some historical perspective on the use of shelf-space and revenue-sharing distribution agreements for fund providers may be helpful to understand why Vanguard’s announcement is so disruptive. The first “no transaction fee” (NTF) online brokerage platforms got going in the 1990s, pioneered by companies like Schwab with their OneSource program, establishing a giant online supermarket of mutual funds that were made available (and funded) by 12b-1 shareholder servicing fees and sub-TA fees instead of charging “traditional” transaction fees to purchase a fund. But then along came ETFs, which “felt” like mutual funds to many consumers who wanted to be able to buy them without transaction fees as well… except, ETFs don’t have a 12b-1 fee or a sub-TA fees! As a result, when the online brokerage platforms wanted to offer ETFs under a no-transaction-fee platform, they needed a new way to get paid. What emerged was brokerage platforms negotiating “distribution” agreements directly with the ETF providers that effectively said, “If you want to be listed in our NTF platform, you need to pay us directly”, taking the form of other a revenue-sharing agreement (paying basis points for assets on the platform) or “shelf-space” agreements (which are typically negotiated flat fees and not set as basis point directly, though they are still effectively loose basis point equivalents based on total assets). The key point: one way or another, fund providers had to pay to be on the NTF platform, which is why most NTF ETF platforms have a limited lineup (or only those providers willing to pay).

And, mostly out of necessity for distribution opportunities, many fund providers have paid to be on these platforms. The bold exception to this trend was fund companies like Vanguard and DFA, which were notorious for not paying dollars under the table to get onto these NTF platforms. Early on when many NTF ETF platforms were being built out, Vanguard still wasn’t nearly as dominant in the ETF space as they are today, so many companies allowed Vanguard onto their platforms as a way to validate their platform (with Vanguard’s name recognition) in the hopes of attracting clients who might also use some of the other NTF funds (that do pay to be listed). But as Vanguard has continued its meteoric rise over the past several years, Vanguard attracted so much in assets onto these platforms that it was adversely impacting the profitability of the entire platforms… leading companies to swap Vanguard out for other ETF providers that were more willing to pay to participate.

And that is why it’s such a big deal that Vanguard made the announcement this week that it’s going to make virtually all ETFs available on its own online brokerage platform. The significance is that they’re offering a no-transaction-fee platform without requiring the same back-end shelf space payments that all the other brokerage and custodial platforms require. In other words, the latest move by Vanguard isn’t a price war against ETF trading fees; instead, it’s declaring war on the entire model of asset managers being forced to pay back-end revenue-sharing and shelf-space agreements to get onto those platforms in the first place, by offering their own and not charging the asset managers what everyone else charges!

How will this potentially play out from here? ETFs that currently pay NTF platform fees are compelled to increase their expense ratios to cover the cost (because the money has to come from somewhere to pay)… except now ETF providers have a problem: their ETF expense ratios are boosted higher to compete on NTF platforms at companies like Schwab, Fidelity, and TD Ameritrade, but the higher expense ratios to cover the distribution costs on those platforms will reduce their competitiveness on the new mega Vanguard platform! As a result, ETF providers may be compelled to start creating a new series of their popular ETFs, with those additional distribution costs stripped out, creating a lower-cost “clean ETF” that can better compete in a true NTF environment. Yet once this happens, since the ETFs will be available elsewhere as well (just with a transaction cost instead) it will recreate the multiple-share-class effect we have now in mutual funds, where there’s a higher cost version of the mutual fund in the NTF platform – because it’s pushed up by the 12b-1 and sub-TA fees – and then there’s a lower cost version of the same mutual fund you can buy directly. Which ultimately will lead to consumers (and advisors) adopting whichever fund is cheaper in their situation, putting further pressure on custodians to offer less conflicted models where investors (or advisors) are simply charged a transparent basis point fee for the clearing and custodial services provided instead.

But ultimately, the key point is to acknowledge that the real news is not that Vanguard is simply offering a larger NTF platform than other providers. The real news is that this may be a fatal disruption to NTF platforms themselves, and a step towards a more transparent model of custodial services over the more conflicted models of back-end distribution agreements that currently exist!

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Donor-advised funds (DAFs) are flexible tools which can be used for a number of charitable giving purposes. One increasingly popular use is to use an “endowment-style” DAF in lieu of a private foundation for those with charitable intentions of leaving a legacy that will continue to have an impact on the world many years into the future, given that DAFs are cheaper to operate, more tax efficient, more flexible, and eligible for higher limits on tax deductibility of contributions. However, while much attention has been given to how individuals should allocate a portfolio throughout their own lifespan, considerably less attention has been given to the question of how to best allocate a portfolio if one’s time horizon is “forever”. Especially when it has flexibility with respect to its distributions.

In this guest post, Dr. Derek Tharp – a Kitces.com Researcher, and a recent Ph.D. graduate from the financial planning program at Kansas State University – analyzes considerations when coordinating investment and spending policies of an endowment-style DAF, finding that for donors who have the willingness and ability to be flexible in their distribution policy, investment allocations can be much more aggressive than those commonly adopted by endowments, generating far more income for charitable beneficiaries and build a larger endowment value to sustain giving well into the future.

The traditional approach to investment an endowment is still a well-diversified conservative or moderate growth portfolio – e.g., a 60/40 portfolio – owing in large part to the fact that most endowments have a high need for distribution stability (e.g., university endowment funds that need to fund ongoing operating costs that universities have become highly dependent on). However, in the context of an endowment-style DAF, the reality is that individual donors often have far more flexibility about when and how much they donate. Which is important, especially with the possibility of 100+ year time horizons that allow for immense (and intuitively-difficult-to-grasp) compounding.

In fact, a Monte Carlo analysis (based on historical market returns) of an ultra-long-term endowment-style DAF with a flexible (e.g., percentage-of-assets) distribution policy finds that shifting a fairly modest $100k endowment-style DAF from a balanced portfolio allocation (50/50) to an aggressive allocation (100/0) would result in an extra $13.6 million in inflation-adjusted median endowment account value after 100 years, while also generating an additional $5.6 million in distributions to charitable institutions along the way (albeit with some volatility in annual distributions from year to year)! Further, adopting a simple dynamic spending/distribution strategy (e.g., forego a distribution in years with less than a 2.5% real return), results in an additional $6.1 million boost in real residual value and $1.2 million more in cumulative charitable distributions (as distributions are skipped in some years but made up over time)!

Ultimately, the key point is to acknowledge that willingness to accept some spending instability, coupled with ultra-long-term time horizons to compound, makes it feasible to have a far more aggressive portfolio that still result in substantially more assets going to the charitable institutions that donors care about. Of course, donors must be willing to stay the course, avoid projecting their personal risk tolerance onto the endowment, and be comfortable adopting an allocation that is much more aggressive than the “norm” among prominent endowments… but donors should be cognizant of the tremendous potential of investing more aggressively (and the impact of long-term compounding) if they are willing and able to be flexible!

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As one of the more common processes developed in advisory firms, there is a high level of interest by both advisors and clients in how investment performance is actually calculated. While it may seem straightforward in determining the ups and downs of a portfolio, there are actually quite a bit of assumptions and factors that take into consideration time periods, account values, and especially deposits and withdrawals, in addition to the actual performance of the underlying investments in a portfolio.

On the surface, it may seem straightforward in how these calculations are developed; however, in practice, there are often many areas and methods that are not as understood, and can become a source of confusion as advisors select a method for providing this critical information to clients, regulators, and other industry bodies such as GIPS.

In this article, Chris Hastings of Panoramix (a portfolio performance reporting software solution for advisors) provides a detailed reference for the different methods of calculating performance, why the various methods can produce substantially different return results (especially when there are substantial cash flows in/out of the portfolio), and some of the pros and cons of each method.

Ultimately, the reality is that there is no “right” choice for how to compute performance – because the “right” methodology actually varies depending on the context in which it’s being used – but advisors should be familiar with the different methods, and when they are most appropriate, so they can adequately defend their choices, and identify performance reporting software solutions that are capable of providing the return calculations they need.

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In the investment world, it’s common to discuss average rates of return, both in a backward-looking fashion (e.g., to report investment results), and in a more forward-looking manner (e.g., to project the average growth rate of investments for funding future goals in retirement planning software). However, the reality is that because returns are linked to each other – the return in one year increases or decreases the available wealth to compound in the subsequent year – it’s not sufficient to simply determine an “average” return by adding up all the historical returns and dividing by how many there are.

Instead of this traditional “arithmetic mean” approach to calculating an average, in the case of investment returns, the proper way to calculate average returns is with a geometric mean, that takes into account the compounding effects of a series of volatile returns over time. Which is important, because in practice the geometric average return is never as high as its arithmetic mean counterpart, due to the fact that volatility always produces some level of “volatility drag”, which can be estimated by subtracting ½ of the investment’s variance (standard deviation squared) from its arithmetic return.

Fortunately, the reality is that most investment returns, as commonly discussed by financial advisors, are already reported as geometric returns, typically stated as either a Compound Average Growth Rate (CAGR), an annualized return, or some similar label. Which means, intended or not, most financial advisors already project future wealth values in a retirement plan using the (proper) geometric return assumption.

However, the variance drain on a sequence of volatile returns still matters when financial advisors use Monte Carlo analysis, which by design actually projects sequences of random volatile returns (based on the probability that they will occur) to determine the outcome of particular retirement strategies. Because the fact that volatility drag is already part of a Monte Carlo analysis means that the return assumption plugged into a Monte Carlo projection should actually be the (higher) arithmetic return, and not the investment’s long-term compound average growth rate. Otherwise, the impact of volatility drag is effectively counted twice, which can understate long-term returns and overstate the actual risk of the prospective retirement plan!

The good news is that some Monte Carlo software tools, recognizing that most financial advisors report returns using the industry-standard geometric averages, already adjusts advisor-inputted return assumptions up to their arithmetic mean counterparts. However, not all Monte Carlo software automatically makes such adjustments. Of course, in many cases, financial advisors may wish to use lower return assumptions in today’s environment, given above-average market valuations and below-average yields. Nonetheless, advisors should be cognizant of whether they are unwittingly entering lower-than-intended return assumptions into their Monte Carlo retirement projections, compounding geometric returns in a manner that double-counts the impact of volatility drag!

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Good diversification is a staple of financial planning advice, though the principle long pre-dates financial planners. From the aphorism “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”, to Talmudic texts from 3,000 years ago directing people to split their wealth evenly between cash, real estate, and business, the virtue of limiting exposure to risk from diversification is an “accepted truth”.

Except the reality is that, when you look to those who achieve the greatest wealth or have the greatest impact, virtually none of them ever diversify… or at least, not throughout most of their years. After all, if Bill Gates had “just” diversified into the S&P 500 after Microsoft IPO’ed, he’d have barely 1/40^th of the wealth he does today. In fact, most of those on the list of the richest billionaires are people in their 60s, 70s, or 80s, who have held a concentrated interest in their businesses for nearly their entire lives. Like the redwood tree, they waited a very, very long time before branching out… and as a result, were able to grow the tallest.

Of course, that doesn’t mean that diversification is always bad. Most “trees” are actually short bushes and shrubs, that grow just a few feet tall, but are still able to broaden their shoots and leaves enough to grow healthy. In the investing context, it’s the equivalent of a person who diligently saves and invests in a portfolio for decades, and retires with “comfortable wealth”.

Still, it’s important to recognize that diversification isn’t literally always the winning strategy, and for those who are young and have a long time horizon, arguably not even a necessary one. In fact, the weakest tree is the Bradford Pear – known for growing a V-shaped trunk, effectively diversifying itself from the start… in a manner that virtually ensures the tree will eventually either collapse under its own weight, or succumb to external forces.

For those who have decided they have “enough”, the satisficing strategy of the bush may be just fine. But for those who decidedly want to generate more wealth or have more impact, perhaps the redwood strategy is underrated after all? In fact, the highest-risk losing strategy may actually be the pear tree strategy of trying to have it both ways at once!

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Regulators around the world require financial advisors to assess their clients’ risk tolerance to determine if an investment is suitable for them before recommending it. For the obvious reason that taking more risk than one can tolerate will potentially lead to untenable losses. And even if the investment bounces back, an investor who loses more money than he/she can tolerate in the near term may sell in a panic at the market bottom, and miss out on that subsequent recovery.

Yet the reality is that many investors end up owning portfolios that are inconsistent with their risk tolerance, and it’s only in bear markets that they seem to “realize” the problem (which unfortunately leads to problem-selling). Which raises the question: why is it that investors don’t mind owning mis-aligned and overly risky portfolios until the moment of market decline?

The key is to recognize that investors do not always properly perceive the risks of their own investments. And it’s not until the investor’s perceived risk exceeds his/her risk tolerance that there’s a compulsion to make a (potentially ill-timed) investment change.

Yet the fact that investors may dissociate their perceptions of risk from the portfolio’s actual risk also means there’s a danger than the investor will misperceive the portfolio risk and want to sell (or buy more) even if the portfolio is appropriately aligned to his/her risk tolerance. In other words, it’s not enough to just ensure that the investors have portfolios consistent with their risk tolerance (and risk capacity); it’s also necessary to determine whether they’re properly perceiving the amount of risk they’re taking.

And as any experienced advisor has likely noticed, not all investors are equally good at understanding and properly perceiving the risks they’re taking. Some are quite good at perceiving risk and maintaining their composure through market ups and downs. But others have poor “risk composure”, and are highly prone to misperceiving risks (and thus tend to make frequently-ill-timed portfolio changes!).

Which means in the end, it’s necessary to not only assess a client’s risk tolerance, but also to determine their risk composure. Unfortunately, at this point no tools exist to measure risk composure – beyond recognizing that clients whose risk perceptions vary wildly over time will likely experience challenges staying the course in the future. But perhaps it’s time to broaden our understanding – and assessment – of risk composure, as in the end it’s the investor’s ability to maintain their composure that really determines whether they are able to effectively stay the course!

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Historically, socially responsible investing (SRI) has been about a fundamental decision: whether to hold a “traditional” diversified portfolio, or to screen out companies for various environmental, social, or governance (ESG) criteria in order to meet an SRI mandate. The end result has been an endless debate about whether a portfolio that used ESG screens will subsequently produce returns that are better, worse, or the same as the traditional portfolio.

Yet the reality is that an SRI approach doesn’t have to be a choice between traditional portfolio investing or using ESG screens. An alternative approach is to try to shape the stocks in a traditional portfolio to better adhere to an SRI mandate, by leveraging the proxy voting and shareholder engagement process to steer the company’s management itself in a more SRI-focused direction.

In this guest post, Justina Lai and Ria Boner of Wetherby Asset Management share how they implemented an ESG shareholder engagement initiative within their own advisory firm, leveraging the outside resources of an external non-profit called “As You Sow” that works with institutions (including advisors) to mobilize shareholder resolutions.

The end result of their ESG shareholder engagement initiative was a deeper engagement with clients themselves, for what was ultimately a fairly modest financial and logistical cost for the firm. However, because there are specific requirements that must be met for clients to vote proxies, including owning individual securities directly, affirming their ownership, and delegating proxy voting authority to a third party, advisory firms must be certain to implement a proper process to ensure their shareholder engagement efforts with clients are successful!

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As financial advisors increasingly adopt ETFs, the wholesale shift from actively managed mutual funds to passive investment vehicles is driving more inflows to ETF providers like Vanguard and Blackrock and State Street and than all other mutual fund families combined… and leading mutual fund companies into a mad scramble to figure out what they have to do to once again appeal to financial advisors.

Yet the reality is that, with the rise of the internet, the fundamental role of the financial advisor themselves is changing. In a world where consumers can purchase virtually any publicly traded investment online themselves, financial advisors are compelled to add value above and beyond “just” bringing third-party mutual fund managers to the table. In fact, an increasing number of financial advisors appear to be “coping” by eliminating third-party managers, and instead becoming the investment portfolio managers themselves.

In this context, the rise of ETFs is not so much about a shift from active to passive, but simply a recognition that when financial advisors build investment portfolios, we prefer to do it using ETFs as our “building blocks”, rather than individual stocks and bonds. Although in point of fact, a recent FPA Trends in Investing Survey revealed that advisors are increasingly building portfolios with ETFs, and stocks, and bonds, and even private equity funds – anything except third-party mutual funds. Which just helps to show how the shift from active to passive is really just a mirage; what’s really occurring is a process where financial advisors are remaining active, but disintermediating mutual fund managers and going hands-on to actively build the portfolio themselves, whether as an independent RIA, or under a Rep-As-PM arrangement in a broker-dealer.

Of course, the caveat is that just as many mutual fund managers have struggled in an increasingly competitive market for alpha to outperform their benchmarks, there’s no indication that individual financial advisors are any better at the process. Which means ultimately, the financial-advisor-as-investment-manager shift itself may be short-lived, as advisors further shift to providing financial planning value outside of the portfolio altogether. But until financial advisors get to the point that the majority of us truly view our value-add as going beyond the investment portfolio – where a bona fide shift to passive investing may gain further traction – the ongoing rise of ETFs will remain less about a shift to passive itself, and more about how financial advisors are defending their own fees by squeezing out the costs of the investment products they use for client portfolios!

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This week is the first that financial advisors must operate under the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule, subject to Impartial Conduct Standards which require that they must give best interests advice, for reasonable compensation, and make no misleading statements. While much has been said about the impact this will have for advisors and their clients, there’s also a not-well-discussed secondary shift that will be triggered by the DoL fiduciary rule, which will impact actively managed mutual funds and their performance in the coming years – in a “surprisingly” positive way.

In this week’s #OfficeHours with @MichaelKitces, my Tuesday 1PM EST broadcast via Periscope, we discuss how the DoL fiduciary rule will likely end out causing an improvement in the return performance of actively managed mutual funds, thanks to the rise of clean shares and a shift in how brokers are compensated for recommending such funds!

Most predictions about the likely impact of the Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule is that it will lead to a (continued) decline in the use of actively managed mutual funds, and support the ongoing rise of passive ETFs, thanks to the fiduciary rule’s focus on low cost. But the truth is, that there actually is no requirement in the DoL fiduciary rule that financial advisors eschew actively managed funds and switch to lower cost passive funds. The only real requirement is that if an advisor is going to use an actively managed fund, that there needs to be a clear reason and justification for paying that active manager’s fee. And if you can make the case for the active manager, there’s nothing wrong with using the actively managed fund.

There is, however, a requirement to use the lowest cost share class if multiple share classes of the same fund are available. This is why we’ve seen the launch of T shares and clean shares – which either pay a uniform 2.5% upfront commission and 0.25% trails, or eliminate commissions entirely with the broker-dealer then wrapping a levelized commission around the whole fund or account. And this matters, because mutual funds currently have to report their performance net of commissions and broker compensation. But as broker-dealers shift to being compensated by levelized commissions outside of the funds (even if the consumer still pays a 1% fee via the broker-dealer equivalent to the 1% trail in a C share), the mutual fund itself will no longer have to count the broker’s compensation against their own performance!

And this is important because a lot of mutual fund managers have not been underperforming by the amount of the manager’s fee, but instead, they’ve been underperforming because of the drag of the broker’s commission compensation. Which means, “suddenly”, we’re going to start seeing the average actively managed mutual fund begin to improve on its performance… starting this week, with the rollout of the DoL fiduciary rule (and the rapidly rising adoption of clean shares in particular). Not because mutual fund managers are necessarily managing any differently or better, but simply because they’re no longer paying broker compensation out of their own performance track records! Ironically, this may even handicap RIA performance reporting relative to brokers, given that brokers typically point to mutual fund performance (which will not include the broker-dealer’s level commission payout) instead of account performance, whereas advisors in an RIA that want to market GIPS-compliant performance track records will still have to follow specific rules requiring a full accounting for fees.

In the end, this shift may still result in a roughly-similar total cost to consumers – whether it’s a 1% AUM fee, a 1% commission, or a 1% broker-dealer payout wrapped around clean shares – but the net result nonetheless is that with a shift to clean shares, reported performance for actively managed mutual funds is going to start looking better. Which means in a few years, we may suddenly be talking about how much better actively managed mutual funds are doing again. But it won’t be because “the pendulum swinging from passive to active”… or because that’s when the Fed started accelerating their rate increases… or whatever else happens economically from here. It will be because DoL fiduciary reconfigured how brokers get paid, reducing the need for 12b-1 fees, reducing the expense ratio of actively managed mutual funds, and improving the reported performance of the mutual fund itself!

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